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Report of the Coalition for a New America:
Platform Section on Communications
Policy*
Rodney A. Smollat

INTRODUCTION: THE COALITION FOR A NEW AMERICA

It is 1996, and frustration in American society has reached a
critical mass. Despite the promises of prior elections, there is a
mounting federal deficit; a sluggish economy; high unemployment;
increasing violent crime; alarming drug use, particularly among the
nation's youth; spreading HIV -related deaths; and cities across the
nation have been beset by episodes of racial and ethnic violence,
often as severe as the Los Angeles riots following the 1992 Rodney
King verdict. There is a growing sense that American society is
careening out of control. The public mood is almost desperate.
Against this backdrop, a nonpartisan coalition of prominent
American citizens has formed a new political party called the "Coalition For A New America" (the "Coalition"). The Coalition is
comprised of successful leaders from business, science, philosophy,
medicine, law, divinity, journalism, and education-but not politics. Indeed, the Coalition has disqualified from leadership roles all
career politicians, persons currently holding public office, and professional political advisors and pollsters. The Coalition launched
its entry onto the American political scene by commissioning a series of "Coalition Task Force" studies to reexamine all major components of existing American society and to suggest a comprehensive and meaningful restructuring of existing American public
policies and institutions. The various task force reports were
melded into a general party platform (the "Coalition Platform")
* Editors' Note: The following article presents a fictional futuristic "thought
experiment" posed by Professor Rodney A. Smolla. The views expressed by the "Coalition
for a New America," and witnesses who appeared to testify in proceedings conducted by the
Coalition, may or may not be those of Professor Smolla. Any resemblance to real persons or
events is purely coincidental.
t Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law,
College of William and Mary. This paper was presented at the University of Chicago Legal
Forum Symposium in October 1992.
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that formed the Coalition's blueprint for fundamental changes in
the basic infrastructure of American society.
Many of the sweeping changes suggested by the Coalition's
platform would require changes in the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, the Coalition Platform calls for convening a new Constitutional Convention with a mandate to consider whatever
changes in the Constitution would be necessary to implement the
Coalition's proposals.
As the 1996 election approaches, the Coalition appears poised
to accomplish one of the most dramatic "peacetime revolutions" in
modern history. The Coalition Platform, published as a paperback
book, is a best-seller. The Coalition has assembled a full slate of
Coalition candidates for all pending state and federal offices. All
Coalition candidates have pledged to try to implement the Coalition Platform.
One of the most significant components of the Coalition Platform is its "Section on Communications." This section calls for a
series of changes in American policies regarding the freedom of
speech and of the press, many of which would require altering existing First Amendment doctrines and principles. The Section on
Communications was written .by the Coalition's Task Force on
Communications Policy, comprised of distinguished American business leaders, philosophers, journalists, legal scholars, scientists,
and educators with special interests in communications issues. The
Task Force convened for several months in Chicago, Illinois (at the
facilities of the University of Chicago) to formulate the Coalition's
policies on communications matters.
The following memorandum presents a summary of the Coalition Platform's Section on Communications.
MEMORANDUM
SUMMARY OF THE COALITION PLATFORM
SECTION ON COMMUNICATIONS

In the course of its deliberations, the Coalition Task Force on
Communications Policy heard the testimony of many experts on
free speech and press, including several representatives of the
institutional press. The Coalition Platform contains substantial
annotations noting that testimony, including discussions of legal
and policy arguments made by the institutional press that the Coalition subsequently rejected. This memorandum summarizes testi-
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mony before the Task Force and the Task Force's recommendations, and reproduces excerpts of the testimony where appropriate.1
PREFACE

The Coalition Task Force on Communications Policy is
acutely conscious of the legacy of the "Hutchins Commission," the
popular name for the "Commission on Freedom of the Press,"
chaired by University of Chicago Chancellor Robert Maynard
Hutchins during the 1940s. In 1947, the Hutchins Commission
published a report entitled A Free and Responsible Press (the
"Hutchins Commission Report"). 2 The Coalition Platform is in
many respects an update of the basic philosophical principles articulated by the Hutchins Commission Report. 8
' The Coalition Platform is far too lengthy to reproduce in its entirety. In order to
provide the reader with the full flavor of the Coalition's agenda, this memorandum reproduces all of the Coalition Platform's major proposals concerning speech and press. However,
only selected portions of the proposals, including selected excerpts from the Coalition's annotations to its recommendations, are reproduced here.
• Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and Responsible Press (University of
Chicago Press, 1947) ("Hutchins Report"). The Commission was chaired by Hutchins; the
Vice-Chair was Zechariah Chafee, Jr., a noted First Amendment scholar and Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School. The other members were: John M. Clark, an economist; John
Dickinson, a law professor and General Counsel of the Pennsylvania Railroad; William Earnest Hocking, a philosopher; Harold D. Lasswell, a law professor; Archibald ·MacLeish, a
poet, lawyer, and former Assistant Secretary of State; Charles E. Merriam, a political scientist; Reinhold Neibuhr, a philosopher; Robert Redfield, an anthropologist; Beardsley Ruml,
Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Arthur M. Schlesinger, a historian; and
George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College.
Throughout this article, the views of the Hutchins. Commission and its report are referred to as those of the "Hutchins Commission" or the "Commission." The Hutchins Commission's findings should be kept distinct from the views of the Coalition Task Force, which
are referred to as the recommendations of the "Coalition" or the "Coalition Platform."
• The Coalition Task Force notes, with admiration and approval, the work of Professor
Lee Bollinger, particularly his book Images of a Free Press. See Lee C. Bollinger, Images of
a Free Press (University of Chicago Press, 1991). The Coalition Task Force describes
Images of a Free Press as a critical examination of the "central image" of the American
ideal of freedom of the press, an image crystallized by the Supreme Court's opinion in New
York Times Co. u Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964). See, generally, Anthony Lewis, Make No
Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (Random House, 1991). Bollinger's book
argues that this traditional image of the press and the First Amendment model of press
freedom that emanates from it ought to be replaced by a more sophisticated imagery, one
that incorporates a model of public discourse that places a greater premium on enhancing
the quality of public discussion and decision-making. In Bollinger's view, public institutions-including the legal system-have a constructive role to play in improving the tenor of
this public debate. Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 23. Bollinger suggests that a new
"Hutchins Commission" be convened in the 1990s to reexamine the current state of the
press and press law in light of the rich body of experience, court decisions, and legal scholarship that has been generated since 1947. "Much has changed in the quarter century since
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It should be stated at the outset that censorship is not tolerable in a free society. Accordingly, the Coalition's broad outline of
suggested reforms must, when actually drafted as legislation and
regulations, be carefully crafted so as to preserve free speech and
press to the greatest extent possible.
Many thoughtful witnesses who testified before the Task
Force advised using extreme caution in any attempt to regulate the
communications marketplace. For example, one witness pointed
out that it is almost impossible to predict how new communications technologies will evolve or what the social impact of such new
technologies will be:' Several witnesses noted that new communications technologies almost always trigger a social impulse to censor.'1 Historically, technological innovations in communications
have revolutionized both law and policy, often triggering cycles of
robust free expression followed by official regulation or censorship,

the [Hutchins] Commission's report, and today the most important matters calling for investigation are of a kind best suited to the perspective of a disinterested and independent
commission." Id at 135. The Coalition is proud to take up Professor Bollinger's challenge.
• See, generally, M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of
Law (Oxford University Press, 1989). Professor Katsh writes:
One of the clear lessons of the history of printing is that we should be extremely
wary of assuming that the early form of a new technology will be the same as the
mature or developed form. The first printed books, for example, looked very much
like manuscripts. The typeface used was similar to a written script.... We are
still in an age in which video tries to emulate film while much of what emanates
from computers strives to be similar to print. For example, desktop-publishing
programs take pride in their ability to duplicate traditional typefaces. Wordprocessing programs feature justified margins to make the output from "printers"
look more printlike. History is, in a sense, repeating itself as the technology
stresses its ability to produce a product that looks familiar. The new technology
seems to be able to do what the old did but with greater efficiency and at lower
cost.
Id at 260-61.
• In the prescient words of Ithiel de Sola Pool:
Civil liberty functions today in a changing technological context. For five hundred
years a struggle was fought, and in a few countries won, for the right of people to
speak and print freely, unlicensed, uncensored, and uncontrolled. But new technologies of electronic communication may now relegate old and freed media such
as pamphlets, platforms, and periodicals to a corner of the public forum. Electronic modes of communication that enjoy lesser rights are moving to center stage.
The new communication technologies have not inherited all the legal immunities
that were won for the old. When wires, radio waves, satellites, and computers became major vehicles of discourse, regulation seemed to be a technical necessity.
And so, as speech increasingly flows over those electronic media, the five-century
growth of an unabridged right of citizens to speak without controls may be
endangered.
Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies of Freedom 1 (Belknap Press, 1983).
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followed in turn by protest and eloquent pleas for freedom. 8 For
· example, governments around the world reacted to Gutenberg's
new printing press by indulging in the impulse to censor, 7 and a
series of British licensing laws provoked John Milton to write his
famous tract on free expression, Areopagitica. 8
Having said all of this, however, the Coalition has come to the
conclusion that American society must come to a new understanding of what is meant by freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. Quoting Charles Beard, the Hutchins Commission described
what it clearly thought was an outmoded notion of freedom of the
press: "'[l]n its origin, freedom of the press had little or nothing to
do with truth telling.... Most of the early newspapers were partisan sheets devoted to savage attacks on party opponents. . . .
Freedom of the press means the right to be just or unjust, partisan
or non-partisan, true or false, in news column or editorial column.' " 9 The Hutchins Commission offered an alternative vision:
Today, this former legal privilege wears the aspect of social irresponsibility. The press must know that its faults
and errors have ceased to be private vagaries and have
become public dangers. Its inadequacies menace the balance of public opinion. It has lost the common and an• The Roman censors who, in addition to the mundane administrative matters of state,
had charge of the superintendence·of public morals, found it only natural to persecute the
fledgling Christian church, an upstart threatening good Roman morality. Those abused as
children often become abusers as adults, and the Roman Catholic Church, in its stodgy
middle age, became a vengeful censor. The Church banned "heresy" (a word with an interesting etymology, derived from the Greek word for "choice") by prohibiting "choice" on
matters of faith and morals, punishing the heretical choosers with everything from excommunication to execution. Censorship was logistically simple for the early Roman censors and
Roman Catholic Church because handwritten books were laboriously produced by a small
number of persons under the strict control of authority, leaving no opportunity for the mass
distribution of printed material challenging the orthodoxy. In 1493 the Venice Inquisition
issued the first list of banned books; in 1559 the Church established the Liborum Prohibitorum, or Index of Banned Books, binding on Roman Catholics (and thus virtually the
entire population of Europe). The Index was administered by the Office of the lnqui~tion,
which continued to operate in France as late as 1774 and Spain as late as 1834. (Today there
is no Inquisition but there is still an Index, though the Church now regards it as advisory
only.) See Michael Scammell, Censorship and its History-A Personal View, in Kevin
Boyle, ed, Article 19 World Report 1988: Information, Freedom and Censorship 2-3 (Article
19, 1988).
7
Shortly after Gutenberg invented the printing press in 1450, official authorities invented the first censorship bureau. In 1485, only thirty-five years after Gutenberg made
mass dissemination of the written word a technological possibility, the Archbishop of
Mainz-the city where Gutenberg lived-created an office of the censor. Id at 3.
• Id at 4.
·
• Hutchins Report, Appendix at 131 (cited in note 2), quoting Charles Beard, St. Louis
Post-Dispatch Symposium on Freedom of the Press 13 (1938).
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cient human liberty to be deficient in its function or to
offer half-truth for the whole. 10
The Hutchins Commission did not call for government regulation but instead warned of its coming. The Hutchins Commission
argued that the press must become responsible or regulation would
follow: "The legal right will stand if the moral right is realized or
tolerably approximated." 11 Convinced that the moral obligations
contemplated by the Hutchins Commission have not been "tolerably approximated," let alone "realized," the Coalition Task Force
finds that the legal right can no longer stand. 12

I.

FREEDOM

oF

SPEECH AND PRESS:

A SuMMARY

STATEMENT

oF

PRINCIPLE

A central driving philosophy of the Coalition Platform is that
the press should be an agent of elevation. The press should make
us better-not just better informed, but better: better people living in a better society. 13 The press should help make us more civilized, more thoughtful, more rational.
What should American society ultimately expect and demand
of the press? The Coalition Platform reaffirms the vision of the
Hutchins Commission, which concludes that the press should
provide
first, a truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account
of the day's events in a context which gives them meaning; second, a forum for the exchange of comment and
criticism; third, a means of projecting the opinions and
attitudes of the groups in the society to one another;
fourth, a method of presenting and clarifying the goals
and values of the society; and, fifth, a way of reaching
~

Hutchins Report, Appendix at 131 (cited in note 2).

Id.
•• Throughout its deliberations, the Coalition was presented with arguments by the
press and others that the Coalition's proposals ran counter to First Amendment rights.
When presented with evidence of instances of bad journalism, the reflexive response of journalists was often to cite the First Amendment, and its guarantee of a right to be wrong.
Again, what we have here is a failure to communicate. For it is not a complete answer to the
charge that one is wrong to respond that one has a right to be wrong. One may have a duty
to be right even when there is a right to be wrong. And if the duty is systematically ignored,
the contours of the right itself may be modified.
•• See Hutchins Report at 4 (cited in note 2) ("[T]he press can do its duty by the new
world that is struggling to be born. It can help create a world community by giving men
everywhere knowledge of the world and of one another, by promoting comprehension and
appreciation of the goals of a free society that shall embrace all men.").
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every member of the society by the currents of information, thought, and feeling which the press supplies. 14
The recommendations of the Coalition Platform are intended to
advance these objectives.
The Coalition Platform calls for a redefinition of the American
concept of "freedom." For the nation to survive, freedom can no
longer be conceptualized. as the mere liberty to pursue selfish gain.
Thus, the Coalition Task Force's conception of "freedom of the
press," indeed its conception of "freedom" itself, is not the minimalist libertarian notion of freedom, as in "freedom from government interference." The Coalition uses the phrase "freedom" in a
manner that includes, within itself, a notion of virtue, of quality.
In this respect the Coalition quite deliberately endorses the views
of the Hutchins Commission. The Hutchins Commission entitled
its report "A Free and Responsible Press," as if it understood
"freedom" and "responsibility" as separate concepts in which one
is related to the other through moral obligation (as in the familiar
admonition, "with freedom comes responsibility").. Yet, the word
"free," as used by the Hutchins Commission, has built within it
something more than independence-indeed, the very opposite of
independence-it has within it a sense of fulfillment that can come
only through the vindication of obligation, obligation to one's self,
to one's profession, to one's culture, to one's truth. 111 The time has
come to view the matter not simply in terms of what the Constitution may do for the press, but what the press may do for the Constitution.18 The time has come to view the matter not merely in

14

Id at 20-21. When measured against these goals, the Hutchins Commission did not
find the performance of the press very impressive:
The news is twisted by the emphasis on firstness, on the novel· and sensational; by
the personal interests of owners; and by pressure groups. Too much of the regular
. output of the press consists of a miscellaneous succession of stories and images
which have no relation to the typical lives of real people anywhere. Too often the
result is meaninglessness, flatness, distortion, and the perpetuation of misunderstanding among widely scattered groups whose only contact is through these
media.
Id at 68. As is made clear throughout the Coalition Platform's Section on Communications,
the quality of the press has deteriorated since the Hutchins Commission rather .than
improved.
•• In the words of the Bible, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you
free." John 8:32.
•• The Coalition proceeds from the major premise that the press should act as a cooperating partner with government and other public institutions in the process of self-governance. The Coalition understands that this idea runs counter to the American press's tradition of independence and that the policy choices contained in its Platform would require
rejecting or modifying a body of First Amendment jurisprudence. The amendments likely
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terms of freedom for the press, but also as freedom from the
press. 17
When the Hutchins Commission warned that "freedom of the
press is in danger," 18 it did not refer simply to the "independence
of the press": it meant that the soul of the press was in danger. 19
The Coalition endorses, and indeed expands upon, this argument.
The Coalition Task Force Report is more than a baseless threat of
legal sanction, more than "clean up your act or face regulation."
The argument is more profound: The press must reform or lose its
salvation, lose its reason for being, lose that which elevates and
connects it to civilized life, lose that which makes it possible to call
itself a profession. The Hutchins Commission hoped that the press
would reform itself. 20 That has not come to pass. The Supreme
Court has, only on rare occasion, rendered decisions in which the
First Amendment has not prevented punishing unethical journaliswould include restrictions on disclosure of truthful information, despite the Supreme
Court's heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such restrictions, at least as to
non-participants in the proceedings.
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 US 829 (1978), for example, the
Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute that made it a criminal offense to
divulge information pertaining to disciplinary or ethical charges pending before Virginia's
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. In defiance of the law, a Virginia newspaper, the
Virginian Pilot, published an accurate report of a pending commission inquiry and identified the state judge being investigated. Id at 840.
Similarly, in Butterworth v Smith, 494 US 624 (1990), the Court struck down a Florida
statute that, with certain narrow exceptions, prohibited a grand jury witness from disclosing
testimony he or she gives before the grand jury. The sweep of the Florida grand jury secrecy
law was extraordinary; the law barred disclosure of the "content, gist, or import" of the
testimony permanently, even after the term of the grand jury had ended, unless the testimony was disclosed in a court proceeding. See id at 627.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted that prior to appearing before the
grand jury, the witness "was free to speak at will." 494 US at 635. After an appearance,
however, the witness is no longer free to disclose the "import or gist" of the testimony, and
the ban extends into the indefinite future. Id. This, he said, was "dramatic." Id. Its "potential for abuse . . . through its employment as a device to silence those who know of unlawful
conduct or irregularities on the part of public officials, is apparent." ld at 635-36.
The Coalition believes that the holdings of these cases should be rejected or modified as
needed to permit the evolution of a more constructive partnership between the press and
government.
11
See Hutchins Report at 18 (cited in note 2) ("Freedom of the press means freedom
from and freedom for.").
18
See id at 1 ("The Commission set out to answer the question: Is the freedom of the
press in danger? Its answer to that question is: Yes.").
18
See id at 2 ("This danger in the case of the freedom of the press, is . . . in part the
result of the failure of the directors of the press to recognize the press needs of a modern
nation and to estimate and accept the responsibilities which these needs impose on them.").
•• See id at 91 ("The Commission hopes that the press itself will recognize its public
responsibility and obviate governmental action to enforce it.").
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tic behavior. In Cohen v Cowles Media Co., 21 for example, the
Court held that the First Amendment did not prevent an award of
money damages to a source whose promise of confidentiality had
been breached. 22 The Coalition now intends to do what the Hutchins Commission predicted might happen: engage the imagination
of society and the force of law to reform the press. 23 Freedom of
expression, as the Coalition Platform conceives it, is a moral right
because it contains an element of duty. 2 '
The duty is something beyond self-interest, indeed beyond the
immediate and obvious interests of the community: "It is the duty
of the scientist to his result and of Socrates to his oracle; it is the
duty of every man to his own belief." 211 Because the moral right of
free expression is grounded in the duty to the common good and in

., 111 S Ct 2513 (1991).
•• Many witnesses before the Coalition argued that the notion of freedom of press is
broad enough to encompass discretion even to breach promises of confidentiality. The Coalition carefully considered, for example, an argument offered by Professor William Van
Alstyne:
The determination of whether to keep a source confidential, as may have been
promised or, despite that promise to include it as part of the published story, goes
as much to the heart of editorial autonomy as any other decision a newspaper may
make. The extent to which its judgment on such matters may or may not be regarded as fair to the informant does not make it any less a decision for the newspaper to decide, nor different in kind from what was involved in the Tornillo case
[Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 US 241 (1974)]. There, too, one
may agree or (as is more likely) disagree with the newspaper's decision on the
merits but which decision the Court unanimously sustained as part of the freedom
of the press. In Rhinehart [Seattle Times Co. v Rhinehart, 467 US 20 (1984)] the
information was available due solely to a court order enabling the defendant to
secure information it might legitimately need merely in preparing for trial, and
accordingly within the court's authority to limit exclusively to that use. Here,
however, when private parties deal with newspapers on their own initiative, they
must necessarily understand that the risks they incur in doing so are ultimately
risks to be resolved in the editorial room and not in the courts.
William W. Van Alstyne, First Amendment: Cases and Materials Supp 1992 12-13 (Foundation Press, 1992).
•• The philosopher William Earnest Hocking, who served on the Hutchins Commission,
claimed that "[l]aw is the great civilizing agent that it is ... because it is a working partner
with the advancing sense of the community." William E. Hocking, Ways of Thinking About
Rights: A New Theory of the Relation Between Law and Morals, in 2 Law: A Century of
Progress 242, 258 (1937), quoted in Robert E. Drechsel, Media Ethics and Media Law: The
Transformation of Moral Obligation into Legal Principle, 6 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub
Policy 5 (1992). Hocking believed that because of the central role of the press in modern
culture, the press had "lost the common and ancient human liberty to be deficient in its
function . . . . " Hutchins Report at 131 (cited in note 2).
•• See Hutchins Report at 8 (cited in note 2) (Freedom of expression "is a moral right
because it has an aspect of duty about it.") .
•• ld.

158

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1993:

the integrity of an individual's own thought, the right is forfeited
when these duties are ignored or rejected. 26
. The Coalition heard testimony from many members of the
press expressing outrage and resentment at what was perceived as
the Coalition's conviction that American journalists do not comport themselves in a manner befitting a "profession," or that journalists as a group are amoral or unmindful of ethical restraints on
their behavior. Witnesses pointed out that after the Watergate
scandal, codes of ethics proliferated at American newspapers. 27 By
the mid-1980s, more than half of all American newspapers had
adopted such codes, and surveys indicated that over 60 percent of
newspaper journalists at all levels favor written ethical codes. 28
The Coalition Task Force also heard evidence that ethical issues
are taken seriously. Nearly one-fourth of the managing editors in
one survey indicated that they had fired someone for unethical behavior,29 and representatives from many news organizations testified that the ethos of their organizations included compassion and
sensitivity. 80 Other press witnesses criticized the Coalition for the
"aura of moral certitude" that they perceived in many of the Coalition's recommendations. Journalists, they argued, are constantly
faced with ethical dilemmas in which the moral choices are highly
ambigu~us.

81

•• See id at 10 ("Hence, when ·the man who claims the moral right of free expression is
a liar, a prostitute whose political judgments can be bought, a dishonest inflamer of hatred
and suspicion, his claim is unwarranted and groundless.").
17
See Douglas Anderson, How Managing Editors View and Deal with Ethical Issues,
64 Journalism Q 341, 341-42 (1987) .
.•• David Pritchard and Madelyn Peroni Morgan, Impact of Ethics Codes on Judgments by Journalists: A Natural Experiment, 66 Journalism Q 934 (1989); Philip Meyer,
Ethical Journalism 238 (Longman Publishing Group, 1987).
•• Anderson, 64 Journalism Q at 344 (cited in note 27).
•• Representatives from the Indianapolis Star, for example, cited the paper's ethics
code, which instructs reporters:
You must consider the effects on people's lives. Is the story important enough to
warrant wrecking a person's reputation, or breaking up a home, or costing a job?
These are editor's decisions, but reporters too must not lose their compassion in
the quest for a story.
Ethics Code of the Indianapolis Star, quoted in Pritchard & Morgan, 66 Journalism Q at
936 (cited in note 28).
•• Many press witnesses argued that they did not mean to suggest that deviation from
ethical standards should never be punishable through legal sanctions. Many of these witnesses took issue with the Coalition's characterization of the Supreme Court's decision in
Masson v New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S Ct 2419 (1991), as an example of the "perversity" of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. Several press witnesses argued that no
conscientious journalist would defend, on ethical grounds, the deliberate alterations of quotations by a source or by the subject of a story in order to twist the meaning of the quote,
sensationalize the quote, or otherwise alter in a material way the substance or tone of the

·
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The Coalition emphatically does not believe that journalists as
a class are inherently less moral, less sensitive, or less compassionate than other persons. The Coalition believes, however, that competitive market pressures and general cultural forces have conspired to generate patterns of press behavior that have become
increasingly inconsistent with the goals of a decent society and a
progressive democracy. Journalists, like other professionals, may
need the force of law to enforce ethical norms. As the Hutchins
Commission observed, freedom of the press has never been thought
to mean that the "general laws of the country" were inapplicable
to the press. 32 "The First Amendment was intended to guarantee
free expression, not to create a privileged industry." 33
In the Coalition Task Force's view, the press owes a fiduciary
obligation to the marketplace of ideas. 34 An idea should have its
chance in the marketplace whether or not it is shared by those who
own or manage the press, and whether or not it is popular with the
rich or famous. 311 The Coalition Platform advances the notion that
"ideas have standing." Ideas themselves have a right of access to
the market, wholly aside from the speaker who expresses them. 38

quotation. Most journalists, on the other hand, would find no ethical difficulties in altering
(by paraphrasing or editing) quotations in trivial or cosmetic ways, such as to correct foibles
in syntax, spelling, or grammar, or to delete redundant or irrelevant phrases. They maintained that Justice Kennedy, who wrote for the majority in Masson, essentially placed the
First Amendment standard into synchronization with the ethical standard by holding that
proof of intentional alterations of quotations that defame the person quoted by materially
changing the meaning of the quotation may be actionable under the First Amendment. See
Masson, 111 S Ct at 2433. See also Cohen, 111 S Ct at 2518 ("[G]enerally applicable laws do
not offenq the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."). Masson, these witnesses
maintained, is an example of how current First Amendment jurisprudence actually-works
well, permitting legal accountability for ethical deviations that reach the level of intentional
falsification.
•• Hutchins Report at 81 (cited in note 2) .
•• ld.
.. The Supreme Court has allowed the federal government to impose fairness requirements on broadcasters, viewing them as public trustees for the airwaves. See Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v FCC, 395 US 367 (1969). The Coalition believes that the public trustee
concept of Red Lion should be extended to all mass media, regardless of technical format.
•• See Hutchins Report at 9 (cited in note 2).
•• It should be noted, however, that like the Hutchins Commission, the Coalition Platform does not believe that the classical "marketplace of ideas" metaphor supplies the exclusive, indeed even the primary, justification for protection of freedom of speech and press.
The Commission's conception of the value of free expression was expansive and not limited
to the narrow idea that the "marketplace of ideas" would actually produce truth. The Commission clearly saw free expression as valuable for reasons that go beyond the pursuit of
truth, valuable because it fulfills the individual speaker and promotes a mentally robust
public. See id.
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Ideas matter. 87 Ideas are what constitute a culture. And the press
should exist, ultimately, for those ideas, and for the culture they
comprise. 88
The Coalition rejects the theory that the press is bound by
what it believes to be the interests and tastes of the mass audience,
that the press cannot rise higher than these inter~sts and tastes
and still remain in business. 89 As the quantity of com~unications
increases, the ratio of quality to babble declines. Intellectual junk
food proliferates at the expense of nutrition.
The Coalition believes that the press is capable of elevating
the interests and tastes of the American people-by elevating its
own work product. And in the Coalition's view, the press is under a
moral duty, which should now be enforced through legal mandate,
to undertake this effort. This, .it should be noted, is a cornerstone
of the Coalition for a New America's entire agenda: the Coalition
places great faith and emphasis on the transforming. power of the
media. 40 The Coalition believes that the American press is worthy
of accepting this challenge for a new America. 41
87
See id at viii ("The Commission is interested in obtaining a hearing for ideas, not in
adding to the confusion of tongues.").
•• See id at 6 ("Civilized society is a working system of ideas. It lives and changes by
the consumption of ideas.").
•• See Hutchins Report at 91 (cited in note 2).
•o As Professor Lee Bollinger argues:
There is no guarantee that the press will not abuse the freedom it possesses under
the autonomy model. And there are many ways in which it might do so. The press
can exclude important points of view, operating as a bottleneck in the marketplace of ideas. It can distort knowledge of public issues not just by omission but
also through active misrepresentations and lies. It can also exert an adverse influence over the tone and character of public debate in subtle ways, by playing to
personal biases and prejudices or by making people fearful and, therefore, desirous of strong authority. It can fuel ignorance and pettiness by avoiding public
issues altogether, favoring simple-minded fare or cheap entertainment over serious
discussion. Even if the pressures for low-quality discussion come from the people
themselves, as to some extent they do, the press acts harmfully by responding to
those demands and hence satisfying and reinforcing them. It matters not whether
the press is the instigator of what is bad or the satisfier of inappropriate demands
originating in the people. In either case, the press can be an appropriate locus for
reform.
Bollinger, Images of a Free Press at 26-27 (cited in note 3) .
., The Hutchins Commission itself did have praise for the American press:
Private enterprise in the field of communications has great achievements to its
credit. The American press probably reaches as high a percentage of the population as that of any other country. Its technical equipment is certainly the best in
the world. It has taken the lead in the introduction of many new techniques which
have enormously increased the speed and the variety of communications.
Whatever its shortcomings, the American press is less venal and less subservient
to political and economic pressure than that of many other countries. The leading
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SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS

The principal policy recommendations of the Coalition Task
Force on Communications Policy, all of which were accepted as
part of the Coalition Platform, are summarized in the following
list, annotated where appropriate by summary explanations from
the Coalition Task Force's report. Many of these recommendations
would require constitutional amendment. The Coalition Platform
believes, however, that no democracy will tolerate concentrations
of power strong enough and irresponsible enough to thwart the aspirations of the people, and thus that the American communications industry, having failed for decades to control itself, must now
be subject to the force of law! 2 Echoing the warning of the Hutchins Commission, the Coalition Platform observes that the First
Amendment will not and should not save the press from its own
failings, for if the press remains irresponsible and unresponsive,
"[t]he amendment will be amended." 43
A.

Communications Policies Should Be Comprehensive, Embracing All Media, and Applicable to All Subject Areas

A central tenet of the Coalition Platform is that social policy
must be comprehensive and interconnected. Policy decisions in·one
area should not work at cross purposes with policy decisions in
others. In the field of communications, basic philosophical and policy choices should be consistently applied across various forms of
media and with regard to all types of subject matter. Thus, if citizens are to have rights of access to the channels of mass communiorgans of the American press have achieved a standard of excellence unsurpassed
anywhere in the world.
Hutchins Report at 52 (cited in note 2). The Coalition is confident that the press can, if
changes are made, live up to this description.
•• If there is a defining point of departure between the recommendations of the Coalition Platform and the recommendations of the Hutchins Commission, it is that 'the Commission tended to articulate its recommendations as admonitory goals, often to be pursued
through informal mechanisms of social control, rather than direct legal regulation. The
Hutchins Commission thus recommended that educational institutions put more investment
into funding alternative channels of communication. See Hutchins Report at 97-99 (cited in
note 2). It recommended academic centers for the advanced study of communications. Id at
99-100. Further, the Commission recommended that an independent agency be created to
appraise and report annually on the performance of the press. Id at 100-01. Throughout the
Hutchins Report, a distinction was drawn between the moral obligations of the press and its
legal accountability for failing to meet those obligations. See id at 7, 10. The Coalition Platform departs from this split between morality and law, and takes the position that the
moral obligations of the press should become legally enforceable.
•• Hutchins Report at 80 (cited in note 2).
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cation, those rights of access should apply to print, broadcast,
cable, and other forms of media:'" If restrictions on hate speech are
enacted, the restrictions should apply to all types of speech written
in a newspaper or broadcast on a radio program. If society is to
eliminate misleading or fraudulent "thirty second spots" on television, that effort should apply to fraudulent commercial sales
pitches as well as misleading political campaign advertisements.
Forms of communication are converging, collapsing the legal
distinctions that once brought a semblance of order to free speech
policies. 411 New technologies, however, are rendering those divisions
obsolete. In the past, the FCC promulgated the "equal opportunity
doctrine" requiring broadcasters to provide equal opportunities for
political candidates to present their positions;" 6 the "fairness doctrine," requiring that broadcasters "provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints";47 "reasonable
access" rules, requiring stations to provide access to federal political candidates; 48 and "indecency" regulations, prohibiting broadcasters from airing "indecent" speech at certain times of the day. 49
These various forms of content regulation have gone in and
out of favor with the FCC with shifts in reguiatory winds.'10 Never•• The Hutchins Commission recommended that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press be extended to "radio and motion pictures." ld at 82. This seems oddly
quaint and dated to the contemporary ear-quaint because it singles out only radio and film
as the new technologies that deserve protection; and dated because the notion that the First
Amendment applies to all media now seems commonplace. The Hutchins Commission did
not go into much depth, however, concerning the terms on which new media should be
admitted to the First Amendment family. Based on its remarks concerning radio, however,
the Hutchins Commission would appear to be in general agreement with the regulatory
scheme that the Federal Communications Commission ultimately embraced, with the imprimatur of the Supreme Court. See id at 82-83.
•• For most of this century, societies could draw lines of demarcation separating print
media, broadcast media, and common carriers. Historically, radio and television broadcasters, in contrast to print media, have been subject to substantial regulation of the content of
their speech. See FCC u Pacifica Foundation, 438 US 726 (1978); Red Lion, 395 US at 367;
Natl Broadcasting Co. v United States, 319 US 190 (1943).
•• Kennedy For President Committee v FCC, 636 F2d 417 (DC Cir 1980).
47
Syracuse Peace Council v FCC, 867 F2d 654, 655 (DC Cir 1989). See also Red Lion,
395 US at 367.
•• CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 US 367 (1981).
•• See Pacifica, 438 US at 741. The definition of "indecent" speech is much broader
. than the definition of "obscene" speech. Indecent speech includes vulgar or tasteless speech
that does not qualify as obscene under the relatively strict First Amendment definition of
obscenity. The FCC rules, therefore, bar broadcasters from disseminating indecent but not
obscene speech that print publishers could disseminate without restriction.
•• See, generally, Lucas A. Powe, Jr., American Broadcasting and the First Amendment (University of California Press, 1987); Matthew Spitzer, Seven Dirty Words and Six
Other Stories: Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast Media (Yale University
Press, 1986).
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theless, from a First Amendment perspective, the pattern has been
relatively consistent. Generally, courts have upheld content-based
regulation of speech for broadcast media on the theory that the
special characteristics of that media warrant special First Amendment treatment. 111 The Coalition Platform maintains that these
forms of regulation are justified by the public policy rationales that
support .them, rather than the special technical characteristics of
broadcasting, and thus should be imposed on all media. 112
New communications technologies, indeed, are causing print
publishers, broadcasters, and common carriers to converge. Cable
television systems, or computer terminals linked through vast
database networks, may combine elements of print, broadcasting,
and common carrier communication, challenging society to determine the appropriate mix of market regulation and market free.dom that ought to apply. 113 Because of our belief that policies concerning communications influence all aspects of American political
and social life, the Coalition's recommendations are intended to affect a broad range of media and messages. 114

"' As discussed later, courts have been less clear in separating· those aspects of broadcast media that make it technically different from other media from those aspects that
make it different in its social function in the culture. See note 52 and accompanying text.
•• When it first approved federal regulation of broadcasting, the Supreme Court used
the problem of spectrum scarcity as the sole justification for governmental intervention. See
Natl Broadcasting Co., 319 US at 226. In its landmark decision in Red Lion, 395 US at 367,
the Court upheld the fairness doctrine, again relying on spectrum scarcity:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there
are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unbridgeable First Amendment
right to broadcast comparabJe to the right of every individual to speak, write, or
publish. . . . A license permits broadcasting, but the licensee has no constitutional
right to be the one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the
exclusion of his fellow citizens.
ld at 388-89. As argued in the text, the Coalition Platform takes the position that decisions
to regulate the content of speech should be emancipated from the technical characteristics
of the media in which the speech takes place, and instead based upon the social policies that
make regulation of the speech desirable. See note 54 and accompanying text.
•• See, ge11erally, William H. Dutton, Jay G. Blumler, and Kenneth L. Kraemer, eds,
Wired Cities: Shaping the Future of Communications (G.K. Hall & Co., 1987); William W.
Van Alstyne, Interpretations of the First Amendment ch 3 (Duke University Press, 1984).
•• In this respect the Coalition Task Force notes that its efforts are more ambitious
than those of the Hutchins Commission. The Commission's report opened by drawing a
distinction between the influence of the press on the state of public discourse about "public
affairs," and the influence of the press on American culture. The Commission limited its
focus to commentary upon the "role of the agencies of mass communication in the education
of the people in public affairs." Hutchins Report at vi (cited in note 2). The Coalition Task
Force does not limit itself in such a manner.
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B. Legally Enforceable Codes of Journalistic Ethics Should Be
Created
The Coalition Platform makes a general claim that American
society must rededicate itself to maintaining ethical standards in
business, medicine, law, government, education, science, and the
many other callings that constitute society. 1111 Journalists should
not be exempt from this effort, and consistent with the recommendations contained in other sections of the Coalition Platform, the
Coalition calls for the creation of a National Code of Ethics for
Journalists that shall, like the ethical codes for law and medicine,
have the force and effect of law. Specifically, a license shall be required to practice journalism, and the license shall be suspended or
revoked for serious violations of the Ethics Code.
As the Hutchins Commission observed, "[a] profession is a
group- organized to perform a public service." 116 In a profession,
there usually exists a confidential relationship between the recipient of the· service and the person rendering the service. There is
also an "esprit de corps resting, among other things, on a common
training and centering in the maintenance of standards. " 117 In theory, members. of a profession will perform their services according
to certain standards of quality and ethical behavior even though
they could make more money by behaving in other ways. 118
C. Affirmative Obligations on the Media to Provide Public Fora
for Debate and Discussion
All media outlets and organizations should have affirmative legal obligations to act as "common carriers" for public debate and
discussion. 119 This obligation should exist for all mass media, regardless of the technical format. Thus, the duty should be imposed
•• For lawyers and doctors, the ethical standards of the profession are committed to
ethical codes that have nearly the force of law. Currently, nothing similar exists for journalists, though the public service they perform is as important as any. Id at 77. The Hutchins
Commission believed that the ideals and attitudes that cultivate professionalism in law,
medicine, or divinity are nurtured by law schools, medical schools, and divinity schools.
Journalism schools, however, had not taken up the task of imbuing students with any sense
of professionalism. Instead, journalism schools taught mostly "tricks and machinery of the
trade," and missed entirely their central mission: teaching the journalist to be a "competent
judge of public affairs." Id at 78.
•• ld at 76 .
., Hutchins Report at 76 (cited in note 2).
•• Id at 76-77.
•• The Hutchins Commission argued forcefully that the great agencies of mass communication should accept the role of common carriers of discussion. See id at 92.
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on print media (such as newspapers and magazines), broadcast media (such as television and radio broadcast licensees and networks),
wire transmissions (such as cable television operators and networks), and computer communications (such as computer bulletin
boards or databases). The precise nature of this common carrier
obligation will vary depending on the medium's technical capabilities and sociological function, but the general obligation should exist for all media. Press representatives generally accepted that this
public forum function was an appropriate role for the press, at
least as a matter of moral aspiration. Press representatives did not
agree, however, that this function should become a legal obligation.
Further, many press representatives maintained that the press today deserves high marks for its performance in facilitating public
discussion. 60
D. Reform of Laws Protecting Privacy and Reputation
The Coalition proposes legislation substantially limiting the
flow. of information in the private sector and governmental computer databases that invades individual privacy. 61 The Coalition
also proposes reforming tort laws relating to libel and invasion of
privacy. These reforms would provide more meaningful remedies
to persons who have been defamed or who have had their privacy
invaded by emphasizing retractions and right of reply remedies in
lieu of money damages. The Coalition thus urges repudiating the
doctrine of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 62 in which the
Court struck down a Florida "right of reply" statute that granted a
political candidate a right to equal space to reply to a newspaper's
criticism and attacks on his record. 63
80
Several witnesses presented testimony arguing that almost all major media do devote
a significant amount of space or time to the "forum function." In the words of one witness:
The question is not whether the press has been reasonably generous in its common carrier obligations, but whether what is carried has been "elevated discourse." The Coalition cannot have it both ways. It cannot "democratize" the airwaves without putting up with the views of callers who actually use them. And
those, it turns out, vary dramatically, depending on the program.
"' See David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal
Republic of Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States (University of
North Carolina Press, 1989).
•• 418 US at 241.
18
The Hutchins Commission recommended that legislators enact an alternative to the
present remedy for libel whereby the injured party might obtain a retraction or right of
reply. Hutchins Report at 86 (cited in note 2). There was a degree of prescience to this
recommendation, at least in terms of predicting the focal point of public debate. Particularly in the last five years, debate over libel reform has been prominent in the communica·
tions industry.
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As a philosophical matter, the Coalition accepts the validity of
the distinction the Hutchins Commission draws between a "lie"
and an "error."84 Error we will always have with us. The marketplace contemplates error; indeed the advance of science or politics
would not be possible without it. But to lie deliberately is both to
·add an evil to the world that would not otherwise exist, and to use
the right to free expression in a manner that cannot be squared
with the moral underpinnings of the right. 811
The Coalition believes that it should be presumptively illegal
(and grounds for a tort suit for invasion of privacy) for the press to
reveal, without an individual's consent, matters related to an
individual's:
(1) mental and emotional condition, including grief;
(2) physical health;
(3) love and sexual relationships, including sexual orientation;
(4) decisions concerning procreation, including a decision to
have an abortion;
(5) family relationships;
(6) victimization, including whether the individual has been a
victim of violent or sexual assault;
(7) intense and close-knit associations, memberships, and
affiliations;
(8) deep personal beliefs, such as religious convictions; and
(9) personal financial matters.
The Coalition does not maintain that determining whether an
individual's privacy has been invaded is an exact science, but this
is precisely the type of decision well-suited to case-by-case adjudication in the courts. The Coalition merely maintains that certain
.. ld at 10.
•• Id. In an intriguing caveat, the Hutchins Commission was unwilling to calibrate legal
responsibility to the contours of the moral right. Although possibly forfeiting one's moral
entitlement to speak one's mind when engaging, for example, in a deliberate lie, the Hutchins Commission did not believe that legal responsibility could be tied to this intent. "Legal
protection," the Hutchins Commission claimed, "cannot vary with the fluctuations of inner
moral direction in individual wills; it does not cease whenever a person has abandoned the
moral ground of his right." Id.
In crafting First Amendment protection for libelous speech, however, the Supreme
Court has in a sense permitted legal protection to vary with inner moral direction. New
York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US at 254, and its progeny use a subjective standard of fault
geared to the speaker's state of mind. In Herbert v Lando, 781 F2d 298 (2d Cir 1986), for
instance, the Court expressly endorsed the notion that inquiry into the "publisher's state of
mind" was a permissible part of libel litigation conducted under the New York Times standard. Id at 309. For the reasons articulated in the text, the Coalition believes that current
libel law as it has evolved since New York Times Co. v Sullivan should be abandoned in
favor of a regime that places greater emphasis on remedies sue}). as retraction and reply.

149]

COALITION FOR A NEW AMERICA

167

matters should be regarded as acutely private. Existing laws, including existing First Amendment principles, should be altered to
make the press accountable for revealing such matters when there
is no genuine journalistic justification for the revelation.
The Coalition Platform's emphasis on increasing protection
from the invasion of individual privacy is not grounded solely in
the Coalition's solicitude for the victims of such invasion. 88 Instead, the Coalition believes that these invasions also injure public
discourse generally by making the spread of gossip a primary function of the mass media and crowding out information of greater
importance. The Coalition thus seconds the Hutchins Commission's observation that the communications industry "has transferred to mass communication what had formerly passed from person to person as gossip, rumor, and oral discussion."87 The
Commission's disquiet over the tendency of the press to emphasize
scoops, ~ensations, and scandals would certainly find no soothing
balm in the headlines of our times. The Coalition Platform thus
endorses more rigorous privacy laws to deter sensationalist and
prurient reporting, not because these matters will fail to "sell" in
the marketplace, but because reporting on them tends to crowd
out discussion of more significant events and issues.
The Coalition believes that one of the most pernicious tendencies in modern American journalism is the "tabloiding" of the
American press. One of the most popular motifs in prime-time television programming today is the scandal television format, in
which television shows emulate supermarket tabloids in presenting
sensationalistic exposes. Current First Amendment jurisprudence
actually operates perversely in this regard by rewarding tabloid
journalism and penalizing respectable journalists who conscientiously seek to verify the accuracy of information.
A prime example of this tendency is Masson v New Yorker
Magazine, Inc., 68 which involved a psychoanalyst who, through his
professional activities, came to know Dr. Kurt Eissler, head of the
Sigmund Freud Archives, and Dr. Anna Freud, a psychoanalyst
and daughter of Sigmund Freud. In 1980, Eissler and Anna Freud

•• See, for example, Paul Marcus and Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape
Victims' Identities, 64 S Cal L Rev 1019 (1991).
•• Hutchins Report at 53 (cited in note 2). The Hutchins Commission noted that this
phenomenon is ·not new-indeed it may be part of what defines mass culture. Thus, the
oldest "mass medium," the Acta diurna, was an official bulletin board publishing the news
in Rome of th.e first Caesars, including reports of crime, sports, and other sensational events,
as well as official propaganda and news on public affairs. Id.
•• 960 F2d 896 (9th Cir 1992), decision on remand from 111 S Ct at 2419.

168

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[1993:

hired Masson as Projects Director of the Sigmund Freud
Archives. 69 Masson was fired from his job after becoming disillusioned with and lecturing against Freudian psychology. 70
Writer Janet Malcolm, a frequent contributor to New Yorker
magazine, agreed with Masson to write an article about his tenure
with the Archives, based on a series of telephone and in-person
interviews with him. 71 During the editorial process, Masson expressed alarm at what he claimed was misinformation contained in
several passages. Masson asked to review those portions of the article which attributed quotations or information to him, but the defendants never responded to his request. 72 In December 1983, the
New Yorker published the article as a two-part series, and in 1984,
with knowledge of Masson's allegation that the article was defamatory, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., published the entire article as a book,
In the Freud Archives. Masson complained in a letter to the New
York Times Book Review that the book was "distorted," and later
sued for libel. 73
During the tortuous course of the litigation, Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, observed that
publishers like the New Yorker, whose practice it is to investigate
rigorously the accuracy of their stories, are at a disadvantage compared to other newspapers or supermarket tabloids in the application of the actual malice standard:
We are aware that this puts publishers like the New
Yorker-whose practice it is to investigate the accuracy
of its stories-at something of a disadvantage compared
to other publishers such as newspapers and supermarket
tabloids that cannot or will not engage in thorough factchecking. After all, publications that check their stories
for accuracy are more likely to develop "obvious reasons
to doubt" than ones that do not. . . . Readers of reputable magazines such as the New Yorker are f!lr more likely
to trust the verbatim accuracy of the stories they read
than are the readers of supermarket tabloids or even
daily newspapers, where they understand the inherent
limitations in the fact-finding process. The harm inflicted
by a misstatement in a publication known for scrupu•• Masson, 111 S Ct at 2424.
7o Id.
71 ld.
71
Masson, 111 S Ct at 2424-25.
78
Id at 2425.
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lously investigating the accuracy of its stories can be far
more serious than a similar misstatement in a publication
known not to do so. This is not to say, of course, that
statements in publications less rigorous than the New
Yorker cannot be defamatory, or that such publishers
will escape liability when they turn a blind eye to known
or strongly suspected inaccuracies. 74
The Coalition believes that the actions of the New Yorker and
writer Janet Malcolm in the Masson case, if as alleged by Dr. Masson, should be condemned and deserve punishment under the libel
laws. Nonetheless, the Coalition finds the jurisprudence applied by
the courts in Masson utterly incomprehensible, because it results
in greater legal protection for tabloids than for conscientious news
organizations. The law should work in exactly the opposite way,
encouraging careful and thoughtful journalism, and penalizing-even to the point of driving out of business-the shoddy sensationalism of the tabloids. 7 il
E. Greater Protection of Privacy through Limitations on
Commercial Trafficking in Private Information and Alteration
of the Definition of "Public Records"
Individuals should be protected from invasion of privacy by
commercial, governmental, and news organizations using computer
74
Masson, 960 F2d at 901-02 n 5.
•• The Coalition finds the statements of the court in Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v Globe
Inti, Inc., 786 F Supp 791 (W DArk), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 978 F2d 1065 (8th Cir
1992), extremely useful in this regard. The plaintiff in Globe was conservator of the estate of
Nellie Mitchell, allegedly defamed by an article in the Sun tabloid newspaper. The plaintiff
also made invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. Ms.
Mitchell had operated a newsstand on the town square of Mountain Home, Arkansas since
1963. Her suit arose from a story entitled, "World's oldest newspaper carrier, 101, quits
because she's pregnant!" The story concerned a woman in Australia, and a fictitious name,
but the picture used was of Ms. Mitchell. The jury found in favor of the newspaper on the
defamation claim, but also found that the newspaper's conduct invaded Ms. Mitchell's privacy by placing her in a false light and that it constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded $650,000 in compensatory damages and $850,000 in punitive damages, and the district court upheld these awards. See 786 F Supp at 793. The
Eighth Circuit affirmed, but remanded for a substantial remitter of compensatory damages.
978 F2d at 1071.
The district court held that "[t]he invasion of privacy claim stands upon a different
footing than the defamation claim." 786 F Supp at 797, quoting Dodrill v Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark 628, 637, 590 SW2d 840 (1979). False light, the court argued, requires only
a showing that the depiction would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and that the
defendant had knowledge of falsity or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of publication. ld, citing Dodrill, 265 Ark at 638.
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technologies to assemble and traffic in private information. The
concept of "public records" should be altered so as to prevent certain data gathered by governmental entities from entering the public domain. The identity of victims of certain crimes, such as rape
or sexual harassment, for example, should not be treated as "public records~' when official charges are brought by such victims, and
laws should be enacted preventing anyone from publishing the
names of such persons without their consent. 76
The information gathering and storage capacities of modern
government, and of modern news organizations, heighten concerns
regarding the protection of individual privacy, autonomy, and dignity. Computer databases, for example, may immensely enlarge the
capacity of government agencies or major news organizations to
form composite pictures of the transactions and events in an individual's life, creating vast memories that never fade.
The Supreme Court recently addressed this problem in the
context of computerized records of "rap sheets" containing the
composite criminal records of individuals gathered from courthouse and police records scattered throughout the country. Although many of the individual bits of information, such as the dispositions of the cases, were already public records, the Court held
that an individual could have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the composite picture formed by the aggregation of this information in the central computer database of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. 77
F. Restrictions on Hate Speech, Pornographic Speech, and Public
Vulgarity
Just as the Coalition Platform calls for a revolutionary redirection of public resources to clean up the physical environment,
the Coalition Platform also calls for a major effort to "clean the
environment of public discourse." Laws should be passed creating
criminal penalties and rights of private recovery of civil damages

•• There is some ambiguity as to whether implementation of this recommendation
would require modification of the Supreme Court's ruling in Florida Star v B.J.F., 491 US
524 (1989), which held that a state could not punish a newspaper's publication of a rape
victim's name where the victim's name was already a matter of the public record. Nevertheless, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that a well-crafted statute could pass constitutional muster under existing First Amendment doctrines. See Marcus & McMahon, 64 S
Cal L Rev at 1019 (cited in note 66).
11
See United States Department of Justice v Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press, 489 US 749 (1989).
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for various forms ·of offensive speech, including "hate speech,"
"pornographic speech," and "public vulgarity."
It is particularly important that the press do better in attempting to generate tolerance and understanding among the
many constituent groups that exist within American society. In
1947, the Hutchins Commission perceived an America in which
images of many ethnic groups were distorted. The Hutchins Commission thus expressed the humanistic aspiration that the press
work to improve understanding of different social groups. 78
The Hutchins Commission's identification of the problem was
undoubtedly accurate in 1947 and probably remains accurate in
1996. In 1947, racial and ethnic groups were often portrayed as degrading stereotypes. The open and widespread prejudice that characterized American culture then, and that was visible in the mass
media, has certainly diminished dramatically in modern American
life. It would be extremely difficult, for example, to make a convincing case that the principle news organizations upon which
most Americans rely for information today are deeply infected
with racism.
But the truth remains that communication about the many
discrete communities that comprise contemporary America is not
what it should be and that as a society we are a long way from
establishing a cohesive national community. The violence in Los
Angeles following the Rodney King verdict underscored the depth
of racial and ethnic division, distrust,. and despair in modern
American life. We are a multi-ethnic society that is still far from
coming to grips with our multi-ethnicity.
The Coalition understands that prejudice and passion are inevitably part of communication and that irrational elements are
always part of public discourse. The press will always be
prejudiced, for prejudice is endemic to the human condition. And
thus like all speakers, the press will always be at once an agent
with potential for both good and evil.' 9 The Coalition is convinced,
however, that the force of law must now be brought to bear upon
society's. passions and prejudices. Just as the Coalition Platform
•• See Hutchins Report at 26-27 (cited in note 2).
70
See id at 7 ("As freedom of the press is always in danger, so it is always dangerous.").
The Coalition notes that the Hutchins Commission did not see this potential danger as a
justification for regulation; rather, it viewed this danger as part of what supplied spontaneity and life to the marketplace. ld ("[l]f we are to live progressively we must live dangerously."). For the reasons articulated generally in the Coalition Platform, our view is that the
time has run out for the press to reform itself-just as the time has run out for many other
American public and private institutions.
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calls for a massive rededication to principles of equality and
human dignity in American life, 80 the Coalition Platform calls for·
laws that make the press and other speakers accountable for injuries caused by irrational appeals to passion and prejudice.
The Hutchins Commission, it should be noted, wrote at a time
when First Amendment jurisprudence had just begun to develop.
The Hutchins Commission thus embraced the "categorical" approach to First Amendment doctrine characteristic of Chaplinsky
v New Hampshire. 81 The Hutchins Commission wrote that "[t]he
already recognized areas of legal correction of misused liberty of
expression-libel, misbranding, obscenity, incitement to riot, sedition, in case of clear and present danger-have a common principle; namely, that an utterance or publication invades in a serious,
overt, and demonstrable manner personal rights or vital social interests."82 More important, the Hutchins Commission contemplated that the list of categories of permissible regulation could expand, though the burden of justifying further expansion would be
"on those who would extend these categories."83
The Coalition Platform strongly supports the view that categories of permissible regulation of speech should indeed expand in
multiple ways. The time has come to expand the categories of
speech subject to regulation, the definition of those categories, and
the types of regulation permissible for speech falling within them.
The Coalition Platform thus urges the rejection of the Supreme
Court's ruling in R.A. V. v City of St. Paul. 8" The Court's majority
opinion in R.A. V., written by Justice Scalia, employed a sweeping
80
See, for example, the Coalition Platform's recommendations for increasing penalties
for violations of civil rights laws and bias-motivated crimes.
81
315 US 568 (1942). There was a time when the Supreme Court appeared to embrace
a relatively mechanical approach to free speech doctrine, treating certain categories of
speech as utterly outside the protection of the Constitution. The most famous exposition of
this approach came in Chaplinsky, in which the Court listed "the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words' " as among those classes of speech
"the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitu·
tional problem." Id at 571-72.
82
Hutchins Report at 11 (cited in note 2).
88
Id.
.. 112 S Ct 2538 (1992). In R.A. V., the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul, Minnesota, "hate speech" ordinance that provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits
disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn Legis Code § 292.02 (1990). A
minor was charged under the ordinance for burning a cross inside a black family's yard. See,
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rationale that would, if left unmodified, result in invalidating virtually all hate speech laws. The Court's opinion opened with a
broad condemnation of content-based regulation of speech, a condemnation that went out of its way to repudiate the mechanical
"categorical approach" associated with Chaplinsky v New Hampshire.8"' At the heart of the Court's opinion in R.A. V. was the proposition that the First Amendment's restrictions on content-based
and viewpoint-based discrimination apply even when the government regulation involves a type of speech that as a class normally
receives no First Amendment protection. The Court applied a rational derivative of the First Amendment's virtually absolute ban
on viewpoint-based discrimination. Although it is constitutionally
permissible, for example, to criminalize the distribution of "obscene" speech, it is not permissible to single out some subset of
obscene speech-such as obscene speech critical of the government-for specially disfavorable treatment. 86 Similarly, while
speech that meets the current constitutional definition of "fighting
words" may be punished, it is not permissible to take one subclass
of fighting words-such as racist fighting words-and to treat that
generally, Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Overturns Law Barring Hate Crimes, Wash Post
Al (June 23, 1992).
The defendant did not challenge the right of the city to prosecute him for his acts, but
argued that the ordinance was overbroad, because it potentially censored constitutionally
protected speech. 112 S Ct at 2541.
86
Thus the Court in R.A. V. explained:
We have sometimes said that [certain] categories of expression are "not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech," or that the "protection of the First
Amendment does not extend" to them. Such statements must be taken in context,
however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity "as not being speech at all." What they mean is
that these areas of .speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination unrelated
to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the government may proscribe
libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only
libel critical of the government.
112 S Ct at 2542-43 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
88
As the R.A. V. Court stated:
Our cases surely do not establish the proposition that the First Amendment imposes no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of such proscribable expression, so that the government "may regulate· [them] freely." That
would mean that a city council could enact an ordinance prohibiting only those
legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government or, indeed,
that do not include endorsement of the city government. Such a simplistic, ali-ornothing-at-all approach to First Amendment protection is at odds with common
sense and with our jurisprudence as well.
Id at 2543 (citations omitted).
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class more severely because of social disagreement with the racist
message expressed. 87 In a passage that severely limited the reach of
Chaplinsky, the Court argued:
[I]t is not true that "fighting words" have at most a "de
minimis" expressive content, or that their content is in
all respects "worthless and undeserving of constitutional
protection"; sometimes they are quite expressive indeed.
We have not said that they constitute "no part of the
expression of ideas," but only that they constitute "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas." 88
In a nutshell, it is the considered view of the Coalition Platform that the Supreme Court's ruling in R.A. V. could not have
been more wrong-headed and that the Court's ruling in Chaplinsky was absolutely correct, in both letter and spirit. The Coalition
Platform thus calls for a new First Amendment that will reject the
jurisprudence of R.A. V. and reinstate the categorical limitations
promulgated in Chaplinsky.
G. Heavy Public Investment m Funding for the Arts and
Humanities
A significant new investment should be made in the funding of
public programs designed to enrich public discourse and culture,
such as funding for the National Endowment for the Arts and the
National Endowment for the Humanities, as well as their local
counterparts. The receipt of such funding by private artists or authors, however, should be made conditional on their compliance
with all applicable laws governing communications policy.
The Hutchins Commission urged the government to use government-funded mass media to supplement the marketplace. 89
Among the most profound structural changes in electronic communication since the Hutchins Commission's report is the emergence
and flowering of public broadcasting. 90 Institutions. such as PBS on
81

See id at 2545.
•• Id at 2543-44 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
•• Hutehins Report at 89 (cited in note 2).
•• The Hutchins Commission did at times mention, usually in passing, the potential for
government broadcasting. In a footnote early in the Report, for example, it stated: "A third
possibility is that government itself may come into the field with an alternative system of
communications. The Commission has given little consideration to this possibility, except in
international communications. Yet the example of Station WNYC, controlled by New York
City, suggests what government may do in domestic communications if it regards private
service as inadequate." Id at 5-6 n 1.
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television and NPR on radio have changed the communications
landscape; if broadcasting was once a vast wasteland, it is no more.
H.

Increasi11g Rights of Press Access to Public Institutions and
Events

The press should have greater rights of access to public institutions and events, including the operations of government. Except
for limitations that may be justified as narrowly tailored to vindicate compelling governmental interests-such as the protection- of
privacy, or national security secrets-the press should have a right
of access to governmental operations that is commensurate with
the capabilities of modern communications technologies. This right
of access should specifically include the right to enter public buildings and meetings with television and radio equipment and to
broadcast such proceedings, including court proceedings. The right
should also include access to most military operations.
While the Coalition is aware that many elements in the press
have criticized its recommendations, the Coalition believes that its
proposals calling for greater rights of access for the press should be
attractive to journalists, marking an expansion of rights journalists
currently enjoy. 91 Indeed, the Coalition's proposals for greater
rights of access were among the few proposals that gained active
support among representatives of the press who testified before the
Coalition. While the Supreme Court has not been willing to recognize a general right of access to government information, it has
been quite steadfast in maintaining the ~xistence of a specific right
of access to court proceedings and records. An important series of
cases has reinforced this access to trial proceedings, not as a right
of press access alone, but as a right of general public access in
which the press fully shares. 92 In one of those cases, Richmond

In Pell v Procunier, 417 US 817 (1974), and Saxbe v Washington Post Co., 417 US
843 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld regulations of the California Department of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons barring journalists from interviewing specifically
designated prison inmates. In Houchins v KQED, Inc., 438 US 1 (1978), the Court was faced
with case in which television station KQED sought permission to inspect and take photographs at the Alameda, California, County Jail, where a prisoner had reportedly committed
suicide. The conditions in the jail were allegedly decrepit, and these conditions allegedly led
to the prisoner's suicide. Id at 3. The Sheriff of Alameda County, in response to the controversy, announced a program of monthly tours open to the public. Id at 4. Reporters could
participate in the tours, but could not take cameras or tape recorders, or interview inmates.
Id at 4-5. The Supreme Court, in a highly splintered vote, upheld the regulations.
•• See, for example, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980); PressEnterprise Co. v Superior Court, 478 US 1 (1986).
91

a
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Newspapers, Inc. v Virginia, 93 the Court held that both press and
public enjoy some constitutionally guaranteed right of attendance
to places such as criminal trials, which are historically open to the
public:
It is not crucial whether we describe this· right to attend
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a "right of access," or a "right
to gather information," for we have recognized that
"without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." The explicit,
guaranteed rights to speak and to publish concerning
what takes place at a trial would lose much meaning if
access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily. 94

Many representatives of the press testified that they would indeed like to see First Amendment jurisprudence evolve to embrace
far broader rights of access, and they welcomed this aspect of the
Coalition Platform. 911
I. Access Rights of Individual Citizens to the Mass Media

Individual citizens should have legal rights of access to the
mass media without regard to the technical format of such media.
This right of access should be legally enforceable and should include. a right to participate in the "public fora" that such media
shall be required by law to maintain, as well as rights to obtain
retractions or opportunities to reply when attacked in mass media.
In colonial times, "anybody with anything to say" had comparatively little difficulty getting it published. 96 Government censorship was the only real threat to free expression because free expression was decentralized. Today, however, the polity is too large
and complex; a person's idea has no chance of making it into the
marketplace unless the owners and managers of the mass media
give the idea access. Censorship by the government is no longer the
only, if indeed even the primary, threat to the mar~etplace.
Rather, censorship by private actors-principally by those who
•• 448 US at 555 .
.. Id at 576-77 (citations and footnotes omitted).
•• Press representatives were particularly alarmed by the tendencies to grant or deny
access on a discriminatory or selective basis. See Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press
Access and the First Amendment, 10 Communications Lawyer No 21, 16·19 (Summer
1992).
88

Hutchins Report at 14 (cited in note 2).
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own and operate the means of mass communication, has supplanted it. The moral right of those who own the press to speak
their own minds must remain intact; but it must be supplemented
by a moral obligation to grant access to the ideas of others.

J. Antitrust Laws Should Be Revised to Discourage Concentration of Ownership of Mass Media
The antitrust laws should be revised to establish per se rules
that severely limit concentration of private ownership of mass media. The Coalition Platform thus embraces the recommendations
of the Hutchins Commission that the antitrust laws be used to foster competition, and where concentration is necessary in the communications industry, that the government engage in regulation to
ensure that the public gain the benefits of concentration. 97 At various times in its history, the Federal Communications Commission
has adopted rules limiting the number of broadcast stations that a
person may own nationwide 98 or in a single community99 and
prohibiting newspaper publishers from owning television stations
in the same communities in which they publish. 100 The Coalition is
convinced that these regulations should be resurrected, reinforced,
and revitalized.
Some witnesses testified that circumstances have changed
since 1947, and that today efforts to increase diversity in the marketplace are unnecessary. These witnesses testified that the communications marketplace today is in robust shape, as evidenced by
the many channels on cable, electronic town meetings, public
broadcasting, community access television, computers, databases,
computerized bulletin boards, and desktop publishing. 101
There were also witnesses who testified that new technologies
will make it possible for individuals to engage in interactive communications in situations that were once merely passive. Individu•• ld at 83-86.
•• United States u Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 US 192 (1956) (upholding the FCC
regulation that no person or group could control more than seven AM, seven FM, and five
TV stations, now changed to 30-30-12). See 47 CFR § 73.3555(e)(l).
•• In re Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership, 22 FCC2d 306 (1970) (prohibiting the
granting of any application for a broadcast license if after the grant the licensee would own,
operate, or control two or more full-time broadcast stations within the same market).
10
° FCC u National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 US 775 (1978).
101
Former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr, while on the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, made much this same point in endorsing the idea that regulation of broadcasting is
not justified in a world in which there is no numerical scarcity of diverse viewpoints in the
marketplace. See Syracuse Peace Council u FCC, 867 F2d 654, 682-84 (DC Cir 1989) (Starr
concurring).
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als will talk back to their television sets and their local newspapers, and indeed will themselves become broadcasters, publishers,
and database operators as computer terminals, electronic bulletin
boards, new video formats, and technologies yet undreamed of tie
us together in entirely new speech relationships. Large institutions
will no longer talk down from single points at the tops of pyramids
to the masses of individuals at the base. Traditional communications pyramids will instead gradually give way to more egalitarian
models in which multiple speakers interact with multiple listeners,
blurring distinctions between publishers ·and receivers of
information.
The Hutchins Commission perceived concentration of mass
media ownership as one of the most pernicious trends of the
time. 102 Concentration has in many ways accelerated. Yet the picture is mixed, and it is difficult to know exactly what to make of it.
Many old communications empires have grown, but many new
communications empires have also emerged. The national marketplace contains a rich mixture of diverse editorial voices.
At the local level, however, the portrait is often different. Most
towns are one-newspaper towns. The broadcast outlets within a
community are usually owned by large national networks and thus
do not have very distinct editorial personalities. At the local level
it thus becomes specially vital that public access channels be available and that print and broadcast media take to heart their function as common carriers of discussion.
The Coalition is encouraged by the possibility that new technologies will enrich the marketplace of ideas and believes that government regulatory policies should be implemented to further their
development. Despite some positive signs concerning the diversity
of the American marketplace of ideas, it nevertheless remains true
that mass media forms the "umbrella" marketplace that links all
of these sub-markets together. Unless the quality of that general
marketplace is improved, the hopes for a national community moving forward to take control of events and meet the serious economic, environmental, and social problems that beset the nation,
will be dashed.

•o•

See Hutchins Report at 36-51 (cited in note 2).
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Commercial Advertising Should Be Regulated to Eliminate
Image and Lifestyle Advertising and Require Emphasis on
Useful Information

Modern mass advertising has lost all connection to what ought
to be its principle function: providing accurate factual information
to consumers to help them make rational choices in the marketplace. The logic and tenor of public discourse changes as modern
advertising becomes less concerned with conveying information
about products and more concerned with conveying image and fantasy. This debases the normative values once associated with our
cultural images and symbols ana actually alters the identity of the
consumer, who comes to believe that products are invested with
miraculous powers. Powerful advertisers can reshape the media in
their own image encouraging a discourse in the service of waste
and turning what was once a citizen-democracy into a consumerdemocracy.103 Political leaders in turn mimic the strategies of advertisers, further blurring the line between political and commer- .
cial discourse. 10"
The Coalition Platform urges aggressive new regulation of
commercial advertising to force advertisers to return to formats
that emphasize factual consumer information. Implementation of
this proposal would require a significant reduction of constitutional protection for commercial speech. 1011 The Coalition is not an108
The influence of advertisers on the editorial independence of radio broadcasters was
a significant concern of the Hutchins Commission. See id at 95-96.
104
See Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71
Tex L Rev 697 (1992).
100
See, for example, Shapero v Kentucky Bar Association, 486 US 466 (1988) (state.
may not categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business by sending truthful and
non-deceptive letters to potential clients known to face a particular legal problem); Bolger v
Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 US 60 (1983) (federal statute prohibiting the mailing of
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives is an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech); Central Hudson. Gas & Electric Corp. v Public Service Commission of New
York, 447 US 557 (1980) (striking down regulation completely banning electric utility from
advertising to promote use of electricity); Village of Schaumburg v Citizens for a Better
Environment, 444 US 620 (1980) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door or on-street solicitation of contributions by charitable organizations not using at least 75 percent of receipts for
charitable purposes was unconstitutionally overbroad); First Natl Bank of Boston v Bellotti,
435 US 765 (1978) (First Amendment protection extended to corporation in its attempt to
influence voting on individual income tax referenda without a showing of a material effect
on their business or property); Carey v Population Services lntl, 431 US 678 (1977) (prohibition of advertising or display of contraceptives not justified on grounds that ads would be
offensive and embarrassing to those exposed to them and permitting such ads would legitimize sexual activity of young people); Linmark Associates, Inc. v Willingboro, 431 US 85
(1977) (ordinance prohibiting posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on residential property
not justified by township's perception of flight of white homeowners from racially integrated
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tagonistic to aggressive advertising, and certainly the existence of a
profit motive should not, by itself, disqualify speech from significant legal protection. 106 Because the Coalition believes, however,
that mass advertising as it exists in the world today bears little
plausible connection either to the processes of self-government/ 07
or to rational consumer decisionmaking, 108 the Coalition supports
substantially greater regulation of commercial speech.
L. Mass Media and Election Laws
The use of paid political advertisements in electronic mass
media should be prohibited. This will end the "thirty-second spot"
political advertising common today, in which candidates are essentially "sold" to the public like commercial commodities, using imagery and slogans that are often misleading or meaningless and
that often cause political discourse to deteriorate to destructive
mud-slinging. Instead, large blocks of broadcast and cable air time
should be provided free of charge to candidates for political office
to present their substantive views on issues. Broadcast licensees
and cable operators should be required, as a condition for licensure, to dedicate substantial portions of their time to providing
such candidate access during election years. In the weeks prior to
community); Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 US 748 (1976) (ban on advertising prescription drug prices not justified by state's interest in maintaining professionalism of licensed pharmacists); Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809
(1975) (paid commercial advertisement in newspaper protected by First Amendment; conviction of newspaper editor for encouraging or prompting an abortion through the sale of a
publication overturned).
106
See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 761 ("[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form
or another . . . . Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is
"sold" for profit."), citing Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 35-39 (1976); New York Times Co. v
Sullivan, 376 US at 266; Pittsburgh Press Co. v Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 US 376, 384 (1973); Smith v California, 361 US 147, 150 (1959); Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v Wilson, 343 US 495, 501 (1952); Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, 111 (1943).
See also Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression: A Critical Analysis 64 (Michie Co.,
1984).
107
See Thomas H. Jackson and John Calvin Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VaL Rev 1, 5-6 (1979) ("The first amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech and press protects only certain identifiable values. Chief
among them is effective self-government. Additionally, the first amendment may protect the
opportunity for individual self-fulfillment through free expression. Neither value is implicated by governmental regulation of commercial speech."); Lillian R. BeVier, The First
Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 Stan L Rev 299, 352-55 (1978) (arguing against protection for commercial speech because
it bears no relation to processes of politics and public decisionmaking).
108
See Collins & Skover, 71 Tex L Rev at 697 (cited in note 104).
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elections, certain evenings should be dedicated exclusively to these
political fora, and all channels should either be forced to carry
such broadcasts or cease transmission during them.
M.

Limits on Campaign Expenditures and Spending

Limits on campaign contributions and expenditures should be
imposed in order to "level" the influence of money on politics. 109
Limits of $100 per candidate should be imposed on private contributions by all individuals and organizations to political campaigns.110 Limits should also be placed on the amount of money
candidates may spend to run for public office. These limits should
vary according to the office sought, reaching a maximum of
$100,000 for President of the United States. These same expenditure limits should apply to spending by private individuals or organizations that spend money directly to endorse or support candidates for public office. No limits, however, should apply to
spending on speech advancing general political or social causes
that do not directly advance the candidacies of specific persons. 111

For treatments of the topic of political contribution and expenditure regulation, see
William Patton and Randall Bartlett, Corporate "Persons" and Freedom of Speech: The
Political Impact of Legal Mythology, 1981 Wis L Rev 494; Lillian R. BeVier, Money and
Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 73 Cal L
Rev 1045 (1985); Jeffrey M. Blum, The Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and Electoral Campaign Spending, 58 NYU L Rev
1273, 1354-78 (1983); Elizabeth Drew, Politics and Money: The New Road to Corruption
(Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983); Joel L. Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of
Political Opportunity: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, 51 NC L Rev 389 (1973); Joel L. Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments: The Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 Duke L J 851; Symposium,
Money in Politics: Political Campaign Finance Reform, 10 Hastings Const L Q 463 (1983);
Symposium, Political Action Committees and Campaign Finance, 22 Ariz L Rev 351 (1980);
Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and
Opportunities, 56 Fordham L Rev 53 (1987); Note, Equalizing Candidates Opportunities
for Expression, 51 Geo Wash L Rev 113, 195-97 (1982); Laurence H. Tribe, Constitutional
Choices 195-97 (Harvard University Press, 1985). Many of the observations in this section
are drawn from Rodney A. Smolla, When Money Talks: Corporate Campaign Expenditures
and the First Amendment, in 1991 Free Speech Yearbook 31; Rodney A. Smolla, Free
Speech in an Open Society 220-39 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).
"" The Coalition believes that money has had a corrupting influence on politics, and is
a primary cause of many of the nation's current policy ills. See, generally, Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L Rev 505 (1982); John S. Shockley, Direct Democracy, Campaign Finance, and the Courts: Can Corruption, Undue Influence, and
Declining Voter Confidence Be Found?, 39 U Miami L Rev 377 (1985).
"' Implementation of these proposals would require modification of existing First
Amendment doctrines. See, for example, Buckley v Valeo, 424 US at 1 (upholding campaign
contribution limitations but finding expenditure limitations unconstitutional). See also Fed109
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III. THE DAILY GoAL: A TRUTHFUL, CoMPREHENSIVE, AND
INTELLIGENT AcCOUNT OF THE DAY'S EVENTS IN A CONTEXT
THAT GIVES THEM MEANING
The Coalition believes that the press must work harder at separating "fact" from "opinion" in its reporting and at placing events
in context. "It is no longer enough to report the fact truthfully,"
the Hutchins Commission observed. 112 "It is now necessary to report the truth about the fact." 118 It should be pointed out that
many journalists who testified before the Coalition objected to this
passage in the Hutchins Commission Report. To call on journalists
to report "the truth about the fact," some witnesses claimed, is
meaningless, because it insinuates into the. task of reporting a certain pretentiousness about "the truth" that is often both unrealistic and inappropriate. Who in the world, let alone the press corps,
is able to speak with total self-confidence about "the truth" in
breaking events in Berlin, South Africa or Los Angeles?
The Coalition believes, however, that it is merely asking that
the press do more than present cold facts, or the party line, or a
government's official propaganda, requiring it instead to present
events from multiple perspectives using powers of analysis and interpretation to try to arrive at the best provisional understanding
of events. This task is both within the grasp of good reporters and
highly desirable for society.U"
eral Election Commission v Massachusetts Citizens for Life Inc., 479 US 238 (1986); Austin
v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652 (1990).
The Buckley Court rejected the argument that campaign contributions, like draft card
burning, could be regulated as conduct rather than speech. 424 US at 15-16. Nonetheless,
commentators have argued that the Court failed to articulate a rationale for this conclusion.
See BeVier, 73 CalL Rev at 1057-58 (cited in note 109) ("The Court's assertion in Buckley
that '[t]he expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction
of a draft card' is flawed because it rests upon a specious distinction between conduct and
speech. As was true with the draft card burning in [United States v] O'Brien [391 US 367
(1968)], the speech and conduct involved in campaign contributions and expenditures represent an undifferentiated whole.").
"" Hutchins Report at 22 (cited in note 2) (emphasis in original).
113
Id (emphasis in original).
114
The Coalition notes that some press representatives argued that the press's performance today is exemplary, and that attacks on the shallowness of media coverage of major
issues and events is elitist and exaggerated. One witness thus presented written testimony
that claimed, in pertinent part:
It may well be true that many are dissatisfied with the breadth or depth of a
typical half-hour news broadcast by one of the three major television broadcast
networks. But for people who want more than this, more is available. One can
listen to National Public Radio. (The Supreme Court helped secure additional
editorial independence for public broadcasters in 1984, striking down a provision
in the Public Broadcasting Act that prohibited editorializing. See FCC v League
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.Some press representatives balked even at this "assignment,"
asserting that it would necessarily entail blurring of the sharp line
between "fact" and "opinion" upon which the Hutchins Commission had earlier insisted. These witnesses claimed that it is simply
impossible to place events in context, impossible to collate, organize, and synthesize disparate perspectives and bits of information,
without engaging in characterization, judgments about credibility,
and interpretative assessments of history, economics, culture, and
politics. If the journalist, these witnesses claimed, is being asked to
prepare a first draft of history, then the journalist must be J>ermitted to do what historians do.
·
To make matters even more complex, the Coalition was beset
with a highly confusing body of conflicting testimony of the meaning and relevance of the distinction between "fact" and "opinion"
as it exists in current libel and related First Amendment jurisprudence. The distinction between "fact" and "opinion" remains one
of the more vexing features of contemporary libel law, rendered all
the more confusing by the Supreme Court's opinion in Milkovich v
Lorain Journal Co. m In Milkovich, the Supreme Court refused to
recognize a wholesale defamation exemption for the expression of
"opinion." 116 Instead, the Court limited the protection of "opinion"
to statements regarding issues of public concern, thus endorsing
the common law "fair comment" privilege. 117 Many press witnesses
of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364 (1984).) People with access to cable
will normally be able to supplement or substitute network coverage with CNN, CSpan, or PBS. One may be lucky enough to have a local newspaper that provides
excellent political coverage and a strong op-ed page. And in almost every community in the country, the local newsstand, bookstore, or drugstore will carry many
of the great newspapers in the United States, and scores of magazines representing virtually all points on the political spectrum. It is, in short, my impression that
political and news junkies do not have difficulty obtaining their daily
fixes-whether their drug is "hard news" or commentary.
Testimony of Alice Randolph, on behalf of the National Association of Broadcasters.
110
497 us 1 (1990).
118
Id at 18.
117
Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis in Milkovich by reviewing the common
law rules of defamation, including the contours of the fair comment defense. Significantly,
Rehnquist's recitation of the common law doctrines acknowledged that because "unduly
burdensome defamation laws could stifle valuable public debate, the privilege of 'fair comment' was incorporated into the common law as an affirmative defense to an action for
defamation." ld at 13. Fair comment, he observed, provided legal immunity for the honest
expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when based upon a true or
privileged statement of fact. ld. The Chief Justice emphasized that fair comment "was generally privileged when it concerned a matter of public concern, was upon true or privileged
facts, represented the actual opinion of the speaker, and was not made solely for the purpose of causing harm." 497 US at 13-14. "According to the majority rule, the privilege of fair
comment applied only to an expression of opinion and not to a false statement of fact,
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accused the Coalition of disingenuously attempting to exploit the
Milkovich holding-which was widely perceived as a "defeat" for
the press.
IV.

THE ULTIMATE GoAL: THE PRESENTATION AND CLARIFICATION
OF THE GOALS AND VALUES OF SOCIETY

As the Hutchins Commission lamented, in reporting the failings and achievements of the day, the press often· fails to assist
society in the long-term presentation and clarification of its
goals. 118 The Coalition heard testimony from many representatives
of the press who asked whether society wants the press, in its own
voice, to project and clarify goals of society. It was questioned
whether this agenda is compatible with efforts to make presentation of news as objective as possible, or with the role of the press as
a common carrier for debate. 119
Other press witnesses maintained that there is nothing contained within this objective that society should want from the
press that is not already included within the other objectives the
Coalition advances. Journalists cannot do it all, and to ask them to
do too much is to threaten the integrity of their product and dilute
their function. There is a cultural system of checks and balances at
work here, a notion of institutional separation of powers. Society's
journalists are not meant to be its governors, or even its philosophers. News organizations do, of course, editorialize, and in that
sense contribute as "players in the marketplace" in the general societal effort to define long-term policy. But if the Coalition has in
mind a "presenting and clarifying function" any more ambitious
than this, many press representatives argued, it is asking too
much. Nonetheless, if news organizations simply meet the goals of
placing events in context, in deepening our understanding of the
whether it was expressly stated or implied from an expression of opinion." Id at 14, quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 at 171 (1976). "Thus under the common law, the privilege of 'fair comment' was the device employed to strike the appropriate balance between
the need for vigorous public discourse and the need to redress injury to citizens wrought by
invidious or irresponsible speech." ld.
118
Hutchins Report at 27 n 2 (cited in note 2).
118
Some press representatives went even further, taking issue with the whole notion
that anything called "the press" or "the media" even exists. These witnesses argued that
there is no such thing as a unified "press" that has some sort of composite personality and
social function, infused with moral obligation, and validly made subject to the force and
sanction of law. This, one witness argued, "is a utopian vision, and like so many utopian
visions, terrifying in its implications." The witness went on to lament that "[c]ertainly the
idealized image of the press captured by Coalition Platform is a far cry from what the
American press today is. And it is a far cry from what it ought to be."
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unfamiliar, in bridging social and economic chasms among different groups, and in providing an open forum for debate, they will
meet our modest demands.
The Coalition was helped substantially in its thinking by this
testimony, and its recommendations are not meant to be understood as asking of the press anything more dramatic than these
press representatives concede to be appropriate. But even when
measured against this more modest standard, the Coalition is convinced that the press today does not fulfill this obligation.
CONCLUSION

The Coalition is not so arrogant or presumptuous to assume
that in all details and particulars the blueprint for change suggested above is the best for society. The Coalition is convinced,
however, that the policy choices. reflected in this blueprint point
the way toward a more rational and humane conception of freedom
of speech and freedom of the press in a contemporary democracy.
As a society, we must determine the appropriate mix of individual
liberty and social responsibility that we as citizens demand of one
another and of our institutions. Modern First Amendment jurisprudence, and modern conceptions by journalists of their role in
society, have tended overwhelmingly to emphasize the libertarian
and individualistic strains of our national traditions, and underemphasize values of social responsibility and community. The Coalition is convinced that the time has come to bring First Amendment jurisprudence, and our expectations of the press, into a more
sensible balance of liberty and responsibility. The blueprint for
change outlined in the Coalition's efforts point the way toward a
marketplace of ideas better grounded in the moral values from
which free speech and press are ultimately derived, a marketplace
that performs better in providing a truthful and accurate account
of the events of the day, that provides a more thoughtful forum for
the exchange of opinion, that more honestly projects the exper~
iences and attitudes of various groups within society to one another, and that helps to present and clarify the goals and aspirations of our democratic society.

